meta-tolomeo¶
meta-tolomeo is a Yocto BSP and distribution layer collection for the ToloMEO edge computing platform. It targets industrial Linux deployments that require security hardening, over-the-air firmware updates, and software supply chain traceability.
Quick Links¶
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Build the ToloMEO Reference Image
Build and boot a QEMU development image from source.
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Consume meta-tolomeo from your own project with a derived distro and image.
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Configure meta-tolomeo for Your Machine
Override the
TLM_interface for your board. -
Sign the boot chain for i.MX8M and i.MX9.
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Enable OTA file, OTA streaming and USB updates.
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See how the layers split the platform between them.
Tutorials¶
Step-by-step guides that walk through a complete workflow and end with a working result. Start here if you are new to meta-tolomeo.
| Tutorial | Covers |
|---|---|
| Build the ToloMEO Reference Image | The meta-tolomeo target itself: a running QEMU development image built from source |
| Build Your Own BSP Layer | Your own integration project consuming meta-tolomeo, with a derived distro and image |
How-to Guides¶
Step-by-step instructions for specific tasks. Assumes a working build environment.
| Guide | Covers |
|---|---|
| Configure the Development Environment | Builds that survive VS Code sessions, shared state mirrors, host cache directories, a local sstate HTTP server, parallelism tuning |
| Configure meta-tolomeo for Your Machine | Overriding the TLM_ interface, redirecting OTA paths, checking the machine configuration |
| Manage User Accounts | Declaring production image accounts with TLM_USERS, adding an account, and supplying password hashes |
| Generate a HAB4 PKI Tree | CST keys, SRK table, and eFuse programming (i.MX8M) |
| Generate an AHAB PKI Tree | SPSDK keys, SRK hash, and eFuse programming (i.MX9) |
| Enable NXP Authenticated Boot | HAB4 and AHAB boot image signing for i.MX8M and i.MX9 |
| Enable FIT Image Signing | RSA signing of the Linux kernel FIT image |
| Manage the CVE Database | NVD database fetch, API key, backup seeding, and scheduled refresh |
| Export SBOM and VEX | CycloneDX SBOM/VEX generation, kernel CVE enrichment, supplier setup |
| Configure Update Modes | Enabling the OTA file, OTA streaming and USB update modes through DISTRO_FEATURES |
| Generate a Signed Update Package | RSA signing key pair, key location, and a signed full update package |
| Generate a Delta Update | Incremental (rdiff) update packages with binary diffs |
| Generate an Encrypted Artifact | AES-256-CBC encrypted .swu packages |
| Enable Offline Capabilities | Licensed access token, opt-in build with kas/offline.yml, enabling the layer in your own project |
| Run in Standalone Mode | Running a ToloMEO image in QEMU without the devcontainer |
| Test Updates in QEMU | Triggering OTA and USB updates against a QEMU instance |
| Run oeqa Tests in QEMU | Running the oeqa runtime suite (systemd, platform, cloud) and ptests against a QEMU image |
Reference¶
Complete technical specifications, designed for lookup rather than linear reading.
| Reference | Covers |
|---|---|
| kas Configuration | File roles and naming, meta-tolomeo kas fragments, merge semantics, repository pinning |
| Machine Configuration | Machine contract, storage profiles, secure-boot include, required board variables |
| Artifacts Collection | Build output collection classes, artifact directory structure, configuration variables |
| Configuration Classes | TLM_ variable interface, the tolomeo_* classes, required-variable validation, install helpers, image accounts, build-kind distro features |
| Secure Boot | Signing classes, include files, DISTRO_FEATURES, variables, recipes |
| CVE Database | NVD database path, variables, enablement include, and CI refresh job |
| Update Mechanism | DISTRO_FEATURES, recipe variables, conf.d files, runtime variables, installed paths |
| Cloud Connectivity | ToloMEO Cloud egress endpoints, hostnames, IPs, and firewall ports |
Explanation¶
Design rationale for non-obvious choices.
| Explanation | Covers |
|---|---|
| Architecture | Layer separation rationale, the machine boundary, target platforms, build configurations |
| Configuration Interface | TLM_ interface rationale, OTA single source of truth, parse-time validation, class hierarchy |
| Secure Boot Chain | Two-stage boot chain: NXP HAB/AHAB and U-Boot FIT image signing |
| CVE Database Freshness | NVD fetch problem, backup seed, scheduled refresh, per-branch update policy |
| Update Design | Feature flag design, two-layer configuration model, runtime argument composition, anti-rollback checks |
| Encrypted Updates | Feature boundary, signing vs. encryption, on-device key delivery design space |